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A MATTER OF POWER: STRUCTURAL FEDERALISM AND
SEPARATION DOCTRINE IN THE PRESENT
Frances Howell Rudko*
That gentleman [Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky]... has moved a resolution requiring a concurrence
of more than a majority of all the judges of the Supreme
Court to decide that a case is repugnant to the constitution....
I will say then at once that it is among the most dangerous
things in legislation to enact a general law of great and
extensive influence to effect a particularobject; or to legislate
for a notion under a strong excitement which must be suspected to influence the judgement/[sic]. If the mental eye be
directed to a single object, it is not easy for the legislator,
intent only on that object, to look all around him, and to
perceive and guard against the serious mischiefs with which
his measure may brim....
What substantial difference is there between withdrawing a
question from the court, and disablinga court from deciding
that question? To require almost unanimity is to require
what cannot often happen, and consequently to disable the
court from deciding constitutionalquestions....
A majority of the court is according to... the common
understanding of mankind, as much the court, as the majority of the legislature is the legislature:and it seems to me
that a law requiring more than a majority to make a decision as much contradicts the views of the constitution as an
act requiring more than a majority of the legislature to pass
a law.
John Marshall to Henry Clay, December 22, 1823'

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law, North
Dartmouth, Massachusetts. BA., 1959, Southern Methodist University; J.D., 1973,
MA, 1983, Ph.D., History, 1990, University of Arkansas.
1. Letter from John Marshall, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court, to
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I. INTRODUCTION

Public reaction to the 1823 Supreme Court decision in Green
v. Biddle2 prompted John Marshall's letter to Henry Clay, who
had argued the case as amicus curiae for the defendant.3 The
letter is significant because Marshall, who had been a legislator
himself, candidly expresses not only his personal dissatisfaction
with the congressional assault on the 1823 decision but also the
constitutional basis for his opinion. The significance of
Marshall's extrajudicial opinion becomes more apparent when it
is considered in the aftermath of the recent tug-of-war between
Congress and the Court which culminated in the decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores4 of last term. In Boerne, as in Green v.
Biddle, congressional attacks were attempts to control the judicial decision making process, and in each instance Congress

Henry Clay, Counselor (Dec. 22, 1823) (on file with the Henry Wheaton Papers,
Manuscript Division, the Gilder Lehrman Collection, on deposit at The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, N.Y.) GLC 141 [hereinafter Marshall Letter]. The full text of
the letter in its original script is reprinted in the appendix to this article, with special permission granted by the Pierpont Morgan Library.
2. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). In Green v. Biddle, the Supreme Court found tvo
Kentucky statutes unconstitutional because they conflicted with the 1789 VirginiaKentucky compact creating Kentucky. The state statutes created rights for occupying
land claimants against titled landowners whose rights were secured by the 1789 compact. Marshall recused himself from the case as he and his family owned over
400,000 acres of Kentucky land. For a discussion of the case, see G. EDWARD WHITE,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES III-IV: THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 641 (1988); see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 144 n.80 (1990).
3. At the second hearing of the case, Clay, a Kentuckian, argued unsuccessfully
for the validation of the Kentucky laws. When Congress convened in 1823, Senator
Richard M. Johnson from Kentucky proposed that the justices of the Supreme Court
be increased to ten, and that a supermajority of seven be required to decide on the
constitutionality of legislative acts, national or state. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 28
(1823). During the previous session, Johnson had proposed a constitutional amendment requiring that appeals in cases involving the constitutionality of state laws be
heard by the full Senate, not the Supreme Court. The Marshall Court was continuously criticized in the newspapers and in Congress. In 1819, the most controversial
opinion was McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). For a review of
Marshall's editorial response to this criticism, see Gerald Gunther, John Marshall,
'Friend of the Constitution': In Defense and Elaboration of McCulloch v. Maryland, 21
STAN. L. REV. 449 (1969); see also 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 254-363
(Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995).
4. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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attacked not only the decision, but also the authority of the
Court. 5
The historical significance of the Boerne case is two-fold. In
the larger context, the debate, which began with the Court's
1990 decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,6 then escalated into the passage
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 7 and ended
with the Boerne decision, represents a modem version of the
eighteenth century debate which began with Chisholm v. Georgia' and resulted in the passage of the Eleventh Amendment.?
The two episodes can be seen as the first and the latest statements in a continuing discussion of the distribution of power
between the branches of government and between the state and
national governments. In each. episode, an unpopular court
decision was targeted by Congress but by different procedures.
Two hundred years ago in the 1790s, Congress overturned an
unpopular constitutional decision by amending, pursuant to
Article V, the Constitution. ° In the 1990s, Congress overturned an unpopular constitutional decision by passing, pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, a legislative
act which the Court declared unconstitutional under the structural distribution of powers implicit in the Constitution."

5. See Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1; Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157.
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
8. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Court held that an individual citizen of one
state could sue a state. In other words, the judicial power of the federal courts extended under Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution to "controversies . . . between
a State and Citizens of another state." Id. at 431. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN
CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 51 (1993) for an analysis of the case.
Schwartz contends that the Eleventh Amendment may have overruled the holding in
Chisholm, "but the rejection of state sovereignty in [Justice James] Wilson's Chisholm
opinion has today become accepted doctrine." Id. at 53.
9. The amendment went into effect in 1798 and provides that the "Judicial power of the United States shall not .. . extend to any suit in law or equity,...
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State . . . ." U.S. CONST.
adopted
amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment is the first of "four amendments ...
to overrule the Court's interpretation of the Constitution." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONsTiTUTONAL LAW: PRINCEPLES AND POLIcIES 12 (1997). See also HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 127, 128 (1990) (discussing the "constitutional
substitute for legislative statutory revision" and reviewing the four amendments overturning Supreme Court decisions).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
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In the narrower context of the current debate, the Boerne
decision reflects the Rehnquist Court's respect for federalism
and for the distribution of powers doctrine, addresses the scope
of section five enforcement power, leaves for later consideration
the merits of the Smith decision, and illustrates that the Supreme Court is not the isolated, elitist decision making body
that critics assume." A closer examination of the Smith-Boerne
event confirms these observations and highlights the question
posed by the event-why was the Boerne decision not unanimous?
The following discussion does not address the merits of the
religious exercise debate or attempt to define the scope of religious exercise freedom except as it relates to the process by
which the Supreme Court declared the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional. The discussion is based on the
assumption that the current debate is about power.
II. EMPLOYMENT DrvIsION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
13
OF OREGON V. SMITH

The individual opinions in Smith define the disagreement at
the heart of the debate. The majority refused to apply the compelling state interest balancing test to determine whether
Oregon's criminal statute constitutionally infringed upon religious expression." Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, found the appropriate standard to be the rational basis
test when the category being tested involved general neutral
laws which have only incidental effects on religious practices. 5
12. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
14. See id. at 884-85.
15. See id. at 883-90 (examining the validity of Oregon's general statute proscribing drug use, which affected sacramental peyote use). See the penetrating and thorough analysis of the case and the Religious Freedom Reformation Act in Eugene
Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1996). The authors argue convincingly that RFRA should be overturned because it invades judicial territory and creates a dangerous precedent for congressional intermeddling. See id. at 139. They offer three suggestions for solving the
Smith problem: specific religious exemptions by Congress and by the states, a congressional statute which would create a "true federal right of action to enforce and
protect some specified aspects of religious exercise," and a proper case before the
Supreme Court to reconsider and, perhaps, overrule Smith. See id. at 139-41.
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but
strongly rejected the categorical test used by the majority. She
reasoned that the compelling state interest test had been
met.16 Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall dissented." They argued that the balancing test which favors broader protection for religious exercise
should apply. 8
Scalia, in renouncing the balancing test, reasoned that "[t]he
'compelling government interest' requirement seems benign"
because it produces desirable results in some disputes. 9 In
speech content cases, it produces "an unrestricted flow of condiscrimination cases, it produces
tending speech." ° In racial
"equality of treatment."2 ' In religious exercise cases, however,
Scalia contended, "it would produce.., a private right to ignore generally applicable laws," an anomaly-not a norm as in
the other cases." Balancing would involve the judges in the
inappropriate and impossible task of assigning weight and value to religious beliefs in order to test the exercise right against
the government's interest,' and would result in a "parade of
horribles because it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws
the significance of religious practice."24
Scalia's opinion is consistent with the judicial restraint urged
by Justice Felix Frankfurter and legal scholars James Bradley
Thayer and Alexander Bickel,' and the Smith opinion did pro16. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. See id. at 907 (Blackmun, Brennen, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
18. See id. at 909-19.
19. Id. at 885.
20. Id. at 886.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 887.
24. Id. at 889 n.5.
25. Frankfurter supported his ideas on judicial restraint by his reading of James
Bradley Thayer and Justices Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes and John Marshall. They shared the idea that the judiciary should defer to legislation as Thayer
insisted unless "those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational
questioning." James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). For a discussion of
Frankfurter's use of judicial restraint, see FRANCES HOWELL RUDKo, TRUMAN'S COURT.
A STUDY IN JUDIcIAL RESTRAINT 9-14 (1988). For Frankfurter's extrajudicial views,
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duce the result envisioned by that approach. By deferring to
Oregon's right to enact general criminal laws with or without
religious practice exemptions, 6 the Court effectively "forced" or
"allowed" Oregon to do what the Court would not do which was
to provide an exemption." Scalia invited the legislation by alluding to three states with sacramental peyote exemptions'
and emphasizing that values "protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not
thereby banished from the political process.""
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
Immediate public reaction to the Smith decision moved the
debate about the scope of religious exercise freedom into Congress. In direct response to the furor caused by Smith, Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA).3 ° The stated purposes of RFRA were "to provide a
claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government," 1 to restore the pre-Smith
compelling interest test enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner32 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 to free exercise jurisprudence, and to
guarantee application of that test in cases where free exercise

see FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary (discussing proposals to
recall judges and candidate Theodore Roosevelt's 1912 proposal to recall judicial decisions by popular vote) and The Red Terror of Judicial Reform (responding to candidate Robert M. La Follette's 1924 proposal for a constitutional amendment to empower Congress to override constitutional decisions invalidating legislation), in LAW AND
POLrTICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938 3, 10 (E. F.
Prichard, Jr. & Archibald MacLeish eds., 1962).
- 26. The Court held that the state of Oregon under the Free Exercise Clause could
prohibit sacramental use of peyote and, consequently, deny unemployment benefits to
persons violating the law. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
27. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 304 n.35 (1996)
(citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.992(5) (Supp. 1996)).
28. The three states are Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. See Smith, 494 U.S.
at 890.
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of passage.
See Senate Votes to Protect Religion, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1993, at A8.
31. Id. § 2000bb (bX2).
32. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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of religion is substantially burdened.' The Act required more,
however:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except... [when] Government...
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.35
Grievances under the Act could be brought against any government entity or any person acting under color of law.
The supporters of broader exercise viewed the Smith decision
as an expression of judicial abdication, not of judicial restraint.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the opinions expressed
by law professor Douglas Laycock, a consistent advocate and
supporter of the Religious Freedom Reformation Act. Stressing
"the need for independent power ...
to enforce the Bill of
36
Rights," Laycock noted that "the Court does not want final
responsibility for applying the compelling interest test to religious conduct."3" "[Tihe institutional problem... inhibited the
Court from acting independently."3 8 He argued that because
"the Court feared to invoke [judicial powers] on its own," Congress must act to empower the Court to act under a statute
over which Congress would retain control.39
Laycock's support for the legislation was constant. Writing in
1991 when the fate of the proposed bill was in doubt,"
Laycock noted his fear that RFRA, "liberty's only hope for the
foreseeable future" with 160 bipartisan co-sponsors, was in
"mortal danger, caught in a battle over deeply felt side issues"

34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b).
36. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV.
221, 252 (1993).

37. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 253.
39. See id. at 253-54.
40. For an excellent summary of the fragile and shifting coalition supporting
RFRA and of the problems faced in negotiating the Act, see Thomas C. Berg, What
Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 39 VELL. L. REV. 1, 12-17 (1994).
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between competing interest groups. 41 In 1993, Laycock again
reviewed the need for RFRA, now with hope of its passing, and
noted with satisfaction: "The bill [with sixty-six religious and
civil rights group sponsors] would erect a statutory version of
the Free Exercise Clause ....
[It] may42 finally be on the way to
passage after three years of deadlock."
At the same time, Laycock recognized problems inherent in a
legislative scheme of fundamental rights:
Making [free exercise rights] statutory necessarily subjects
religious liberty to shifting political majorities. The great
danger is that in some time of public excitement, Congress
may amend RFRA to deny protection to an unpopular religious practice, or that some interest group may successfully
demand an amendment denying protection to any religious
practices that inconvenience or offend it.'
Such an amendment "may represent a wholly unprincipled
expression of temporary political passion, a tactical victory by
some interest group or bureaucracy"' or a "concession to such
forces by legislators" 45 who expect the courts to save them by
doing "the right thing ...
to protect the affected religious
4
6
minorit[y]." Laycock expressed concern whether, under RFRA,
the Court would have an occasion to revisit and appropriately
overrule Smith. "RFRA may eliminate whatever chance exists of
correcting the constitutional law of free exercise."47 Congress,
however, overruled Smith, and replaced the Free Exercise
Clause with a statute.
In the euphoria following passage of RFRA, Laycock proclaimed the Act to be the "most important congressional action
with respect to religion since the First Congress proposed the
First Amendment."" He praised the act as a "statute designed

41. Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 855 (1992).
42. Laycock, supra note 36, at 221-22.
43. Id. at 254.
44. Id. at 256.
45. Id. at 256-57.
46. Id. at 257.
47. Id. at 254.
48. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REV. 209, 243 (1994).
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to perform a constitutional function," and "a replacement for
the Free Exercise Clause . . . ."4 Laycock concluded, "[s]o Congress in 1993 did what the First Congress had done in 1789. It
enacted a general principle of religious liberty, saying nothing
about individual cases, and it authorized enforcement by the
judiciary, leaving application of the principle to case-by-case
determinations."" The implication is obvious, but the parallel
is historically incorrect because it ignores the process by which
the Congresses operated. The 1993 Congress ignored the
amendment process, the constitutionally prescribed method for
adding general principles to the Constitution,5 and relied, instead, on section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When arguing for the constitutionality of RFRA before the
Supreme Court on February 19, 1997, Laycock insisted that the
statute was "not such a dramatic power grab,"52 pointing out
that the Court "still get[s] the final word on what the statute
means . . . ."5 He agreed, however, with Chief Justice William
Rehnquist that such a final word was "not nearly the same
thing as having, as Marbury said, the final word on what the
Constitution means."54
5
IV. CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion" in the
Boerne case which found that the enforcement power of section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress a
substantive, non-remedial power to legislate. 57 He recognized

49. Id. at 219.
50. Id. at 221.
51. See U.S. CONST., art. V.
52. Official Transcript, City of Boerne v. Flores, No. 95-2074, 1997 WL 87109, at
*42 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Feb. 19, 1997).
53. Id. at *41.
54. Id.
55. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
56. He was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens,
Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in all but
Part III-A-1, the historical analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens
joined the majority, but expressed the view that RFRA, by providing preference for
religion, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor, Stephen Breyer, and David Souter filed dissenting opinions. See id.
57. Kennedy compares RFRA to other statutes declared constitutional under the
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the "ratchet" theory" expressed in Katzenbach v. Morgan59
and discredited it." ° "There is language in our opinion in
Katzenbach v. Morgan... which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.""' He explained the holding in Morgan and put it
in context by adopting Justice Stewart's explanation in Oregon
v. Mitchell,'2 "interpreting Morgan to give Congress the power
to interpret the Constitution 'would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale."' Emphasizing the importance of disavowing such a power, Kennedy continued, quoting

from Marbury v. Madison:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be "superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and, like other acts, .

.

. alterable when the

legislature shall please to alter it." Under this approach, it
is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power. Shifting legislative majorities could
change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult
and detailed amendment process contained in Article
65
V.

enforcement sections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to conclude that
the enforcement power has been "corrective or preventative, not definitional." Id. at
2166.
58. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the scope of congressional
authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAw 341 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe notes that Justice Brennan,
who wrote the opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, fixed a "ratchet-like restraint on the
power of Congress to interpret the fourteenth amendment substantively," meaning
that Congress could only add to the rights, not derogate from them. Id. at 343. See
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONsITUTIoNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 216 (1997).
Douglas Laycock develops arguments in favor of the theory in Douglas Laycock,
RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 145 (1995).

59. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
60. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
63. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 296
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177
(other citations omitted)).
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Having determined that section five power is limited to remedial and preventive legislation, the Court established that
RFRA is not valid preventive legislation entitled to judicial
deference, which requires "due regard for the decision of the
body constitutionally appointed to decide."66 The Court concludes that RFRA's "sweeping coverage" is "so out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.""
Kennedy added that "[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere
of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the
duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and
force of the Constitution."6" However, he concludes that
"[w]hen the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted
within the province of the Judicial Branch... [and w]hen the
political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already
issued, it must be understood" that the Court will follow precedent.69
Justice O'Connor dissented and called for a rehearing, after
full review, of Smith (an issue not before the Court) in order to
"allay the legitimate concerns of a majority in Congress who
believed that Smith improperly restricted religious liberty."70
RFRA had virtually written O'Connor's Smith opinion into
law, 7' and, although she expressed agreement with the

66. Id. at 2170 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 207 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2171.
69. Id. at 2172 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The reasoning presents an inappropriate
basis for review which may explain why the majority of the Court refused to rehear
Smith, why Souter called for a denial of certiorari, and why Scalia remarked, "[t~he
dissents approach has, of course, great popular attraction. Who can possibly be
against the abstract proposition that government should not, even in its general,
nondiscriminatory laws, place unreasonable burdens upon religious practice?" Id.

(Scalia, J., concurring).
71. In an attempt to forecast the votes in Boerne, law professor Michael Paulsen
counted three "solid votes" for RFRA, Justices O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 7, 9
(1997). He was, of course, wrong about one. He predicted that for O'Connor, who
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majority's reading of section five, 2 she refused to join the
majority.73 To explain this refusal, she insisted that the
Court's determination that RFRA is not constitutional is "premised on the assumption that Smith correctly interprets the
Free Exercise Clause."74 She wrote, "[als a yardstick for measuring the constitutionality of RFRA, the Court uses its holding
in [Smith]."75 Kennedy, however, explained that observations
relating to Smith were made "not to reargue the position of the
majority in Smith but to illustrate the substantive alteration of
its holding attempted by RFRA."76 The thrust of the majority
opinion is not that Smith was right, but that Smith was precedent, not to be overturned by legislative act.77

wrote the argument for the compelling state interest test in Smith, "to find RFRA
unconstitutional would be almost inconceivable, as she would have to conclude that it
is unconstitutional for Congress to adopt, by statute, under section five, the same
substantive rule that she thinks is required by section one properly construed." Id. at
10.
72. See 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "I agree with much of the
reasoning ....
Congress lacks the 'power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States. . . . Congress must make its judgments
consistent with this Court's exposition of the Constitution and with the limits placed
on its legislative authority by provisions such as the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
73. Given its harshest characterization, O'Connor's position, under the circumstances, is akin, if not tantamount, to proclaiming that a Supreme Court opinion with
which one disagrees does not have legitimacy in the scheme of constitutional law. A
more generous conclusion is that O'Connor's resistance to the disposition of the case
is part of her political agenda to have the Smith decision overturned. An interesting,
and somewhat unrealistic, characterization is that advanced by law professor Michael
McConnell of the University of Utah College of Law. See Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153
(1997). Justice O'Connor, in his view, was engaging in a "dialogic" approach to section
five power, which "assumes that Congress and the Court are engaged in a mutually
productive dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 172. Continuing the
arguments developed in a brief filed in the case on behalf of the United States Catholic Conference, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Orthodox Church in
America, and the Evangelical Covenant Church, McConnell reasons that the Court
should view congressional legislation as an invitation to dialogue-supposedly in an
open forum manner without the restrictions of stare decisis and the requirements of
case and controversy. He does not recognize that the majority, in fact, responded in a
"dialogue" appropriate to the structure under which the court operates. See id. at
194-95.
74. 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2171.
77. See id. at 2160-62, 2171-72. See generally David E. Engdahl, What's in a
Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457 (1991)
(discussing the concept of finality in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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O'Connor recited an historical review of the status of free
exercise existing at the time the First Amendment was adopted.7" She accessed the history to support her argument that
the Smith opinion is wrong and to emphasize her insistence
that the Court reconsider the holding and "to do so in this very
case" by ordering briefs and setting the case for reargument.7 9
O'Connor's opinion, considered with the two dissents by Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer, signals that the jurisprudence of free exercise is still evolving, although RFRA's
solution to the problem is unacceptable. ° Reasoning that the
"intolerable tension" in free exercise jurisprudence prevented
the constitutionality of RFRA from being "soundly decided,"8
Justice Souter would not have heard the Boerne case. Justice
Breyer refused to consider the case and joined the portion of
O'Connor's opinion revisiting Smith. 2
V. CONCLUSION

Law professor Marci A. Hamilton, arguing for the City of
Boerne before the Supreme Court, captured the essence of the
debate surrounding the Smith-Boerne event with the words,
"[t]his is not a case about religious liberty. It is a case about
[flederal power."' Unfortunately, three of the justices refused

78. See 117 S. Ct. at 2178-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Scalia recounts historical

data to dispute O'Connor's conclusion "that historical materials support a result contrary" to Smith. Id at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring).
79. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. Sentiment for reconsideration of Smith continues. See particularly Justice
Souter's dissent in which he refuses to either endorse or reject Smith and repeats his
doubts, previously expressed in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993), "about the precedential value of the Smith rule." Id. at 2186 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
81. Id. "I would therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted,
and I accordingly dissent from the Court's disposition of this case." Id.
82. Id. (Bryer, J., dissenting).
83. Oral Argument of Marci A. Hamilton on Behalf of Petitioner, City of Boerne
v. Flores, No. 95-2074, 1997 WL 87109 at *5 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Feb. 19, 1997).
Hamilton's opening words were forceful:
[T]he Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was passed in an emotional and heated response to this Court's determination in . .. Smith is
a brazen attempt to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause and to impose
that reinterpretation on the courts, on the State ....

This is the worst

of overreaching, which violates the fundamental structural constitutional
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to decide the important issue presented by the Boerne case.'
Ostensibly, those three justices reasoned that Smith should be
overturned. That, however, should not have obscured the issue
before the Court."5 When John Marshall explained to Henry
Clay his concern about Senator Johnson's attack on the Green
decision, he admitted, "I am perhaps more alive to what concerns the judicial department, and attach more importance to
its organization, than my fellow citizens in the legislature or
executive .. ."86 In the Boerne case, the majority enunciated
a proper insistence that the judiciary maintain its allotted place
within the scheme of government. Justice Kennedy expressed
the need for operating within the constitutional framework:
"[ojur national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the government respects both the
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the
other branches."8 7
Recognizing that the Court, although not directly responsible
to the electorate, provides a vital democratic function, informed
opinion should be unapologetic about the role of judicial review.
Neither the Congressional action proposed in 1823 nor RFRA
survived, but the "strong excitement" propelling the opposition
to Green and to Smith continued unabated."8 Although the
Kentucky occupying claimant laws were declared unconstitu-

guarantees, the separation of powers, Federalism, and separation between
church and State.
Id. at *5.
84. One notes with dismay that the Justices participated in an irrelevant, for
purposes of the decision, and unbriefed discussion about the history of the Free Exercise Clause. This discussion consumed more space than the opinions discussing the
merits of the case. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157.
85. Writing in 1994, Hamilton, not distracted while arguing against the validity of
RFRA, discussed the "crabbed reading of the Free Exercise Clause" and expressed her
opinion that Smith was "wrongly decided because it . . . [left] claimants of religious
liberty with a less than effective forum for their claims." Marci A. Hamilton, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 357, 397 (1994).
86. Marshall Letter, supra note 1.
87. 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
88. See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND
TANEY (1968). Historian Newmyer describes the Green case as an example of "successful state resistance to the Court's decisions." Id. at 88. Newmyer notes that the
Court "did not have the last word, however. The squatters were not persuaded by
judicial sincerity and they refused to obey the decision.... [Mlore effective claimant
laws were passed and enforced . . . ." Id. at 70.
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tional in the Green case, Kentucky laws protecting claimant
rights were upheld eight years later. 9 Public sentiment
against the Smith decision is still strong, and future free exercise jurisprudence will undoubtedly reflect this pressure. The
Smith-Boerne event, in perspective, reveals a "picture of judicial
review that is part of the rich fabric of American political
life... [and the reality that] there is often less finality in a
constitutional decision than meets the eye.""

89. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831). Justice William
Johnson wrote the opinion in Hawkins, noting that the majority in Green thought
that the occupying claimant laws were "like a disease planted in the vitals of men's
estate, and a disease against which no human prudence could have guarded ....
"
Id. at 465. Although Johnson concurred in the result in Green, he faulted the majority for reaching the constitutiohial issue. See id. at 464-66.
90. HARRY J. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 30 (1990). Wellington discusses four traditional restraints-based on textual, historical, functional and structural claims-on the
Court's interpretive duty and concludes that "constitutional interpretation by the
Court endures only when it is proved by struggle to be politically digestible." Id. at
158.
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Appendix
The Gilder Lehrman Collection on deposit at
The Peirpont Morgan Library, New York. GLC 141.
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